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Learning from Military Transformations
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Damon V. Coletta
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ABSTRACT: This article suggests adding a “craftsman” at lower
ranks to steer private-sector projects through the Third Offset
Strategy. This strategy was established by experienced leadership at
the Pentagon to increase military acquisitions of automation and
artificial intelligence technology.

W

hen President Barack Obama’s administration implemented
its transition of executive authority, there was an extra
measure of drama: What would happen, after the change
election of 2016, to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s legacy on defense
innovation, namely, his signature Third Offset initiative? The vision had
been to reorient American defense policy toward filling the ends-means
gap created by two ill-fated wars in the Middle East, the global financial
crisis of 2008, and congressionally mandated defense budget cuts known
as the Sequester.
To defend the country’s extended interests, while containing
operational burdens on American servicemembers, the secretary
reached for, but ultimately failed to grasp, the triumphal legacy of
two formative events in twentieth-century defense policy: the advent
of nuclear weapons and the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
Drawing upon technologies for automation and artificial intelligence
(AI), the Third Offset was supposed to raise the capability of smaller
units in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations, while driving
advances in conventional forces to deter regional competitors and while
maintaining politically feasible budget targets.1
Sixty years earlier, facing long conventional odds in Europe,
nuclear weapons had evened the game.2 The nuclear arsenal, capable of
destroying first tens then hundreds of cities in the Soviet Union within
hours, compensated, or offset, NATO’s conventional deficit in the Fulda
Gap for defending Western Europe against the Red Army.3 Once the
Soviets invested in their own arsenal, however, the effectiveness of the
First Offset was called into question: Why would the United States launch
nuclear weapons against the Soviet army in Germany when Moscow
1      Theodore R. Johnson, “Will the Department of Defense Invest in People or Technology?,”
Atlantic, November 29, 2016.
2      The classic treatment from political psychology is Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). For
an analysis along the lines of constructivism, at the nexus of ideas and foreign policy, see Campbell
Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007).
3      Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring
Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); and Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold
War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009).
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could respond with a massive nuclear attack against the United States?4
To provide the American president with better options, the Pentagon,
beginning during Jimmy Carter’s administration, initiated what would
become the Second Offset—a digital revolution in military affairs.
The Second Offset exploited advances in computer processing and
aerospace technology to build a nonnuclear counterpunch against a Soviet invasion of Europe—for example, in the early years before precision guided munitions were fully developed, the US Army formulated
AirLand Battle doctrine, which aimed to cripple a Soviet-armored
offensive by reaching over the front lines and pummeling Russian
forces at their staging areas.5 Within a decade, this scheme leveraged
novel technologies for precision-guided munitions, standoff weapons,
electronic countermeasures, and remote sensing for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Cold War ended before it was
necessary to employ the Second Offset in a major war, but Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein was likely surprised at how efficiently post-RMA allied
forces destroyed his regular army and elite Republican Guard, built
around massive buys of Soviet equipment.6
Success of the Second Offset, designed as it was for dismembering
industrial-age conventional armies, did not bring about the end of
history. Rather, it inspired US adversaries to devise ways around the
RMA, to plan operations such as the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, or unorthodox campaigns like the Iraqi insurgency of 2005–06
that would damage US interests without providing a convenient target
set for modern air power. While the Pentagon and the Army have
adapted in many ways to complexity after 9/11, violent nonstate actors
are still evolving.7 The Islamic State presented a multidimensional threat
in Iraq and Syria, with terrorist tentacles lashing out at societies in the
United States and Europe. Moreover, major powers such as Russia,
China, and Iran have demonstrated ingenuity in shaping so-called grayzone conflicts according to their strategic interest.
Shortly after ascending to the Obama cabinet, with barely two
years remaining to transform defense policy, Secretary Carter put his
imprimatur, and precious political capital, behind the Third Offset.
There was likely no one better suited for this challenge. During his
graduate days, Carter studied physics under Stanford’s Sidney D. Drell,
who introduced Carter to the technical and public policy challenges of
nuclear arms control. One of the future secretary’s earliest contributions,
a report for Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment, discussed the
perils of transformative missile defense, betting a significant chunk of
4      Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1981), 313–24; and
Bruce M. Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963):
97–109, doi:10.1177/002200276300700201.
5      Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004); James W. Pardew Jr., “The Iraqi Army’s Defeat in Kuwait,”
Parameters 21, no. 4 (Winter 1991–92): 17–23; and John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand
Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1984).
6       Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,”
International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 5–44, doi:10.1162/016228801753191123; Stephen Biddle,
“Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International
Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 139–79, doi:10.1162/isec.21.2.139; and Pardew, “Iraqi Army’s Defeat.”
7      Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2013); and Greg Jaffe and David Cloud, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the
Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown Publishers, 2009).
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the defense budget on a grand scheme to knock Soviet missiles out of
the sky before they could reach the United States.
Further along his path to cabinet rank, Carter researched cooperative
defense at Harvard’s Kennedy School and subsequently served as the
Pentagon’s “chief technology officer,” the undersecretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). During the short hiatus between his
service as deputy secretary of defense (Pentagon Number Two) and his
appointment to succeed Secretary Chuck Hagel, Carter published an
article in Foreign Affair entitled “Running the Pentagon Right.”8 The
article laid out his vision for rapid defense acquisition to meet urgent
and fluid survival requirements of American service personnel, now
struggling on unconventional battlefields across the globe.
Despite this extraordinary level of preparation, plus empathy in
the bureaucracy and Congress for the enormity of the innovationchallenge at the Pentagon, several signs soon spelled trouble for military
automation and the AI-based Third Offset. Under ordinary bureaucratic
conditions, any gravity defying, rapid offset would need impressive
success stories to survive the opposition’s control in Congress and the
loss of the White House. For the Third Offset, superior performance
in defense acquisition did not materialize before the 2016 election.
Republicans on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
fretted over relatively miniscule investments, well under $100 million,
in Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx) initiatives. This
progress occurred despite the secretary of defense personally christening
the first office in the Silicon Valley, far from the Washington lobby but
at the epicenter of transformational innovation nurtured in small- and
medium-sized enterprises.9
Before its first annual review, DIUx was under new management, and
Congress probed modest requests to multiply similar defense innovation
hubs in Boston, MA; Austin, TX; and beyond even as it criticized
the geographical tether to Silicon Valley.10 The National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, at one point in the
mark-up stage, denied DIUx 20 percent of its authorization (75 percent
of its research and development funds) until Carter detailed results from
initial taxpayer contributions and a long-term plan for the organization.11
In addition, Congress coupled the power of the purse with its authority
to reorganize the Defense Department. Within two years, NDAA 2017
abolished the undersecretary position for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, vesting defense technology development duties, to the
dismay of the incumbent undersecretary, in a new, coordinate office for
Research and Engineering.12
8      Ashton B. Carter, “Running the Pentagon Right,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (January/February
2014): 101–12.
9      Aaron Mehta, “Leadership, Structural Changes for DoD Silicon Valley Office,” Defense News,
May 11, 2016; and Patrick Tucker, “As Pentagon Dawdles, Silicon Valley Sells Its Newest Tech
Abroad,” Defense One, April 22, 2016.
10        Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. and Colin Clark, “DIUx: Will Carter’s Innovation Unit Survive
Trump?,” Breaking Defense, November 16, 2016.
11      Fred Kaplan, “The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment,” MIT Technology Review (January/
February 2017); and Scott Maucione, “Lawmakers Demand Answers on DIUx Plan,” Federal News
Radio, December 6, 2016.
12      Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Pentagon Wrestles with How to Break Up ATL,” Breaking Defense,
April 18, 2017.
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Lacking a single, fixed adversary, over the long haul, the US defense
establishment has little choice but to conceive the Third Offset, beyond
any suite of technologies, as a transformation in the process of harnessing
innovation to meet new enemies wherever and whenever they arise. Unlike previous initiatives, success of the Third Offset cannot be scheduled
in clear milestones for adopting specific equipment such as nucleartipped missiles, precision navigation, stealth, or today’s automation. The
Third Offset, then, diverges from its two historical precedents.
For the historical cases, acquisition success can be attributed to a deft,
top-down approach in which efforts of thousands of talented specialists
were orchestrated from on high by legendary defense establishment
figures such as Leslie Richard Groves, during the Manhattan Project,
and William J. Perry during the RMA. By contrast, the present offset
calls for less of a virtuoso conductor—not a singular fleet admiral
directing from the flagship—and greater cultivation of a rough-andready network of riverboat captains. In order to see why this is so, it
helps to understand the nature of each of the prior offset challenges
and why top-down strategy worked as well as it did as recently as rapid
acquisition of mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles at the
end of the Iraq War.
Somewhere between fielding MRAPs and initiating DIUx,
the nature of the technology acquisition challenge confronting the
Pentagon changed. From directors perched at the Pentagon to intrepid
couriers who can navigate labyrinthine byways connecting innovation
at commercial enterprises with future military operations—the agent,
or agents, who will deliver solutions over the next epoch changed as
well. While the type of small and medium-sized suppliers needed are
coming into view, it may, unfortunately, be a while before a new breed
of riverboat pilots for the Pentagon take to their craft. Beyond patent
skepticism in Congress, bureaucratic inertia, another political concern,
poses the biggest obstacle to technological advance via the Third Offset.

Top-Down Success: Riding the Post-World War II Model

The top-down approach to the Third Offset is difficult to reform
in part because it can claim major success during America’s superpower
days in the last half of the twentieth century. Careful orchestration from
national leadership and judicious use of bureaucratic states of exception
attracted talented American technologists. Elite laboratories, or skunk
works, supplied novel ideas and experimentation at moments when
nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, and space-enabled communication
and control networks were needed to revolutionize US defense
capabilities against a relatively well-described adversary.
The approach actually dated from America’s desperate attempt to
catch Germany after entering into World War II late and following
Japan’s abject demonstration of US unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor.
Vannevar Bush, with no government experience—indeed, a certain
disdain for New Deal bureaucracy and regular order—shot through the
underbrush of Washington offices to convince first President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, and eventually key Congressional committees, to fund the
fabled Office of Scientific Research and Development. Assembling the
right talent from universities and tech-savvy industries skirted agency
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red tape and delivered novel wartime solutions—improvements in radar
and proximity fuses—before the enemy could respond, clearly saving
American lives.13
Ironically, the electrical engineer Vannevar Bush did not immediately
sense the world-altering potential of the Manhattan Project. He feared
that the sprawling constellation of atomic labs was scaling too quickly
and that the physicists would not deliver a practical weapon. The
Manhattan Project, though, turned out to be the leading edge of an
historic phenomenon that, while remaining culturally consistent with
the American way of war, sharply altered the relationship between
science and global power. For a number of critical technologies—
nuclear, aerospace, and computing—the time lag between scientific
discovery and military application essentially collapsed.14 Although the
ascendancy of Bush was short-lived, the central message of his famous
essay Science: The Endless Frontier endured.15
Following its mobilization and outright defeat of the Axis powers in
World War II, the US government would commit unprecedented public
investment toward advancing—and steering—science and engineering.
For the nuclear and space age, this support would elevate and shape
the role of physicists in national security. J. Robert Oppenheimer,
Hans Bethe, Herbert York, and Edward Teller among other eminent
names linked the country’s first rank physics departments with strategic
challenges of the day. The younger range of this intriguing list included
Sidney Drell, who in the 1980s directed Stanford’s Linear Accelerator
Center (SLAC) and the university’s Center for International Security and
Arms Control. This combination of interests and responsibilities, made
prevalent by the First Offset, placed Drell in a position to engage fellow
physicist and Russian hero-dissident Andrey Sakharov in what became
riveting public correspondence on the consequences of nuclear war and
the potential for stalled arms control negotiations in the early 1980s.16
Drell personifies a link between the First Offset and today’s offset
strategy. At Stanford, Drell introduced the future secretary of defense,
as a young physics postdoctoral student, to questions of nuclear strategy
that inherently combined scientific and political considerations. From
the press record and Ash Carter’s writings over three decades later, it
is still difficult to gauge how much the psychological foundation set at
Stanford matters for leadership decisions after so many years. Secretary
Carter was effusive with praise and gratitude nearly everywhere he
visited, including Stanford and Silicon Valley.17
13      G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1999).
14       This was Robert Gilpin’s premise in France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1968).
15      Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington, DC: Office of Scientific Research
and Development, July 1945).
16      Herbert F. York, Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco, CA: W. H.
Freeman, 1973); and Philip Taubman, “The Friendships of Sid Drell,” Stanford Magazine (March/
April 2017), 40–41.
17      Jessi Hempel, “DOD Head Ashton Carter Enlists Silicon Valley to Transform the Military,”
Wired, November 18, 2015; and Ashton Carter, “Rewiring the Pentagon: Charting a New Path
on Innovation and Cybersecurity” (speech, Drell Lecture, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA,
April 23, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606666/drell
-lecture-rewiring-the-pentagon-charting-a-new-path-on-innovation-and-cyber/.
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Nevertheless, the literature on presidential personality types and the
oft-studied connection between formative experiences and subsequent
big decisions make it reasonable to guess that some of the context and
feel of the nuclear offset—including its repercussions through the
1980s—passed to the current strategy.18 Such conveyance would have
been accomplished in part according to an extraordinary history of how
the original community of national security physicists recruited the
next generation.
Biographers and researchers weighing psychological factors behind
the Third Offset have a second critical juncture to study. Professor
Carter entered the executive branch for the first time in 1993 as assistant
secretary of defense for international security policy. He soon had the
opportunity to work for, and develop a close relationship with, William
Perry, another mentor with Stanford ties, when Perry, who had been
deputy secretary of defense, became President Bill Clinton’s second
secretary of defense (1994–97). Perry’s background was closer to the old
Vannevar Bush mold—in engineering and technology management. As
undersecretary of defense for research and engineering during Jimmy
Carter’s administration, Perry had been at the forefront, implementing
Secretary Harold Brown’s initial commitment to the second, conventional, offset in response to nuclear stalemate in Europe.19
Returning to government, now at the very highest levels of the
Pentagon, Perry wanted to ensure that technological accomplishments
of the revolution in military affairs—remote sensing, precision
guidance, space communications, and stealth, among others—would
continue to advance after the Cold War. The American people and
their representatives in Congress demanded a peace dividend—indeed,
defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product dipped, at
one point, below pre-Pearl Harbor levels—but in the vacuum created
by the collapse of Soviet power, pockets of chaos marked by ethnic
slaughter and economic misery set off alarm bells and redoubled calls
for American engagement.20
The Pentagon’s solution for escaping this strategic vice—dwindling
budgetary support and domestic political will coupled with rising global
demand for lethal operations “other than war”—was twofold: buy time
by crafting military advice for the president that, in its totality of public
and private channels, dampened White House enthusiasm for using the
RMA to burnish US hegemony and pacify emerging hotspots around the
world. Second, for those missions entering the Pentagon lists—and they
were several covering Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq—apply the RMA to limit costs, especially in terms of the number
of troops deployed and the number of casualties taken.21
18      James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972); and Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference:
Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton (NY: Free Press, 2000).
19        William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015),
33–44; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,”
National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 30–42.
20      Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic (February 1994), captured the early
1990s Zeitgeist. For the Clinton administration’s management of the strategic conundrum, see
Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: Public
Affairs, 2008).
21      Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February
1998): 56–67.
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In order to deliver the Second Offset, it was less a question of
unmasking nature or prodding the leap from physics breakthrough to
weaponization and more a challenge of adapting existing technology
for defense functions. This meant getting the most out of defense
contractors to reduce cost overruns and program delays, even as the
programs themselves became exponentially more complex and market
competition at the prime contractor level less meaningful.22 Precious
few organizations—Boeing or Lockheed at the end of industry
consolidation—understood how to integrate subsystems successfully
and profitably under government regulations for accountability. The
armed services, putative customers for these behemoth high-tech
programs, needed to prepare themselves, and they had to keep political
leadership at the Pentagon on board. Support for each major platform
incorporating smart technology was negotiated with Congress over
several budget cycles. At the same time, weapons and their platforms,
old and new, required a wave of upgrades, sensors, and computers that
had never before been acquired.
During the Second Offset, the armed forces learned by doing, as
they took day-to-day responsibility for holding the primes and the nest
of subcontractors accountable for ambitious promises, without causing
too much disruption that would bankrupt corporations now too large
or too specialized to fail. Finally, revolutionary characteristics of these
systems meant the services would not be able to employ them or to reduce
the costs of force projection without devising new training, tactics, and
procedures, implying a novel, intricate, and more enduring relationship
between military operators and civilian defense contractors.23
The second Pentagon offset that William Perry at one point led
and Ash Carter, during his inaugural service in high office, had the
opportunity to study had its own version of top-down orchestration.
All the moving pieces among the defense contractors had to fit together
through system integration, and the systems themselves had to align
with the special operational test beds prepared for them in the armed
services. In order to bring this plan to fruition, leaders at the Pentagon
needed to develop a sixth sense, knowing which instruments in the
grand enterprise were out of tune—knowing when and how deeply to
intervene in the process—and finally, once at the nub of the problem,
knowing how radically to accept risk and impose states of exception upon
meticulously designed bureaucratic protocols before the overarching
symphony would get back on track.
Second Offset leadership shared essentials with Eliot Cohen’s
Supreme Command: prudential, probing, curious, and, it must be said,
brashly hierarchical.24 As evidenced in Cohen’s Anglo-American case
studies of wartime leadership, Lincoln and Churchill, the ones most
22      David S. Sorenson, The Politics of Strategic Aircraft Modernization (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1995), 157–210.
23      Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield; What Have We Signed Up For?”
(research report, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, March 1999). This
was precursor to general expansion of contractor services coincident with U.S. military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky,
“Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999/2000): 5–51,
doi:10.1162/016228899560220.
24      Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002).
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familiar to his readers, it was fine, even auspicious, if tension, tinged
with frustration and fear, reared up among military professionals toward
civilian authority. Truly constructive “unequal dialogue” could not
occur without friction, and unambiguous civilian control was critical
to transforming the military organization, so it could adapt and survive
against an evolving threat.25
Interpreted in light of civilian leadership developments over
two historic offsets, Secretary Carter’s prime empirical example for
demonstrating how to run the Pentagon right takes on starkly contrasting
significance from what he intended. The tale of how the Defense
Department acquired and fielded the mine-resistant, ambush-protected
vehicle to save American lives from improvised explosive devices in
the latter stages of the Iraq War was presented in Foreign Affairs as if it
were proof of concept for other urgently needed technologies. During
Secretary Carter’s subsequent tenure, even if it were truncated to a mere
twenty-four months, the Third Offset was supposed to succeed along
lines laid by the MRAP program to guide the Pentagon from the top. It
turns out, however, that the MRAP life cycle, rather than the dawn of a
new acquisition strategy for automation and AI, should be viewed as a
reiteration of technique perfected during the Second Offset.
True, the core challenge with MRAP was not about digital hardware,
software development, or systems integration as had so often arisen
during the RMA. The trouble was how to build a functional solution
and get it out to the battlefield in time. Yet, just how the civilian Office
of the Secretary of Defense accomplished the feat of speed recalled
the orchestral (albeit drawn out) masterpieces of Second-Offset
productions—RMA technologies that enabled AirLand Battle, netcentric warfare, even prompt global strike.
Now, unlike much of the Second Offset, the beating heart of the
MRAP gambit was, at least at first, a relatively small defense contractor,
Force Protection International (FPI), which was independent from
the great defense mergers of the 1990s. FPI was just large enough,
in other words, to produce an armored vehicle that would thrive in a
combat environment but small and agile enough to react instinctively
toward raw, informal demand signals issued from the very top levels
of the Pentagon. Being sufficiently small, FPI did well to profit and to
innovate without scaling so fast to capture rapidly expanding demand.
This success, in turn, attracted competing suppliers toward entering the
market. Only a few years after the first contract for Cougar MRAPs,
defense mergers and regular orders rapidly caught up to FPI.26
Carter’s top-down account of the MRAP success described how
undersecretaries for acquisition across two administrations exercised
supreme command over the bureaucracy. In the mold of the Second
Offset—with authoritative urgency, insight at the nexus between political
balancing and military organization, and uncanny judgment—they
25      Indeed, one way of comprehending the offsets is a peacetime version of Cohen’s supreme
command: civilian directed states of exception to whip a hidebound military into condition, so it
may respond and defeat an emergent challenge.
26      Seth T. Blakeman, Anthony R. Gibbs, and Jeyanthan Jeyasingam, “Study of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program as a Model for Rapid Defense Acquisitions”
(master of business administration professional report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
December 2008), 6–11.
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reached past ordinary checks-and-balances to pave the way for MRAP’s
rapid construction and fielding. In doing so, they dramatically accelerated
the pace of acquisition in order to save lives in Iraq. Pentagon leadership
also accepted calculated risk that relatively high level government officials
could allocate sufficient time and accumulate program-specific expertise
in order to hold FPI and other MRAP contractors accountable.
Finally, the locus of defense acquisition for the high-priority, fasttrack MRAP vehicle shifted from the armed services to the civilian Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Accordingly, like an experimental drug
for terminal patients, MRAPs entered the battlefield without standard
testing and laborious training, tactics, and procedures. Over the long
run cropped up certain inefficiencies. As operations evolved, employing
MRAPs presented a steep learning curve for each new unit, and rather
quickly—in terms of the life cycle of a major defense program—service
demand for fast-track MRAPs fell off, raising a question about Secretary
Carter’s inaugural message: Was MRAP so clearly a positive model for
rapid acquisition during the imminent automation and AI offset?27

The Pentagon’s Missing Cadre

Interpreted through the lens of the Second Offset, the MRAP
case qualifies as a success story of applying top-down modes for rapid
acquisition the way the secretary of defense’s office directed digital
integration to revolutionize military operations during the 1980s and
1990s; however, Secretary Carter’s exemplar has not borne fruitful
lessons for the contemporary offset. Unlike the first two quantum leaps
in defense acquisition—nuclear weapons and the RMA—this Third
Offset is less about obtaining specific AI technology and more about the
architecture by which technological innovation is cultivated, harvested,
and sustained for the services, who now face rapidly evolving “pacing
competitors” and unconventional foes.28
Initial speeches by the Pentagon’s “big three”—Secretary Carter,
Deputy Secretary Robert O. Work, and Undersecretary for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall—along with Carter’s high
profile visit to Stanford in April 2015, amplified a bold vision from
top civilian leadership: today, much relevant innovation for cuttingedge military operations happens in the private sector, at small and
medium-sized companies steeped in the start-up culture made famous
by Silicon Valley.29

27      Jen Judson, “30 Years: MRAP—Rapid Acquisition Success,” Defense News, October 25, 2016;
Richard H. Van Atta, R. Royce Kneece Jr., and Michael J. Lippitz, Assessment of Accelerated Acquisition
of Defense Programs, P-8161 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2016), 18–25;
and Alex Rogers, “The MRAP: Brilliant Buy, or Billions Wasted?,” Time, October 2, 2012.
28      Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military
Deterrence,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 31, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article
/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/.
29      Ashton Carter, “Remarks by Secretary Carter at the Drell Lecture, Cemex Auditorium,
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California,” U.S. Department of Defense, April
23, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/607043/remarks
-by-secretary-carter-at-the-drell-lecture-cemex-auditorium-stanford-grad/. For Beltway analysis
and reaction to this claim, see “Implementing Innovation Series: Defense Innovation in a ChangeResistant Ecosystem,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), webcast of a
discussion on Jeffrey P. Bialos, Christine E. Fisher, and Stuart L. Koehl, Against the Odds: Driving
Defense Innovation in a Change-Resistant Ecosystem (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations,
2017), held on May 19, 2017, https://www.csis.org/events/implementing-innovation-series-defense
-innovation-change-resistant-ecosystem.
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This culture, specifically its propensity for innovation, has been,
despite repeated attempts around the globe, devilishly difficult to replicate,
especially in the private sector.30 Given extraordinary performance
requirements, enmeshed in a thicket of regulations characteristic of
the monopsony of military procurement, transplanting Silicon Valley’s
ingenuity into government programs is more challenging. For defense
officials to raise investment unicorns in the military sector, they have
to work like successful venture capitalists who somehow manage to
read subtle indicators of both future supply and consumer demand.31
Which obscure suppliers are on the cusp of introducing novel capability
at an affordable price? Which capabilities solve an emergent problem
for the military client? Which innovations match a complex and rapidly
evolving demand signal?
The triumph of neoliberalism and global capital over planned
economies at the end of the twentieth century reinforced the expectation,
especially in America’s leading innovation economy, that governments
are poor judges of up-and-coming suppliers. Conventional wisdom, in
business literature as well as political economy, waves officials off the
temptation to pick industry winners and instead advises governments
to less obtrusively, or transparently, set the conditions for productive
innovation.32 Part of the reason central authority has such trouble picking
winners is that it has no way of replicating the complex demand signals
of the free market. Even if a supplier’s technology works, customer
demand is not guaranteed.
Shifting, as Secretary Carter attempted, from free-market expansion
to regulated, often classified, production for military use adds another
layer of complexity to the problem of replicating natural innovation.
Senior officials at the Pentagon are not well-positioned to camp out
in the private sector, and when they have the opportunity, they find
themselves tongue-tied by a classification apparatus designed to prevent
information on American vulnerabilities from seeping into the hands of
potential adversaries.
Without a serviceable problem definition, innovative businesses,
especially recently arrived start-ups, cannot move forward with novel
design or production.33 Innovator-suppliers who persist through the
military’s large-scale procurement system begin to think and act less like
swaggering Valley start-ups and more like the stereotypical, button-down
suspects—fastidiously preserving their reputed competency within a
Byzantine defense acquisition processes counter to the freewheeling
innovation coveted by the Third Offset.
30      Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better than Others at
Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Josh Lerner, Boulevard of Broken
Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed and What to Do About
It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
31      Here, “unicorn” refers to the rare start-up that achieves a high valuation very early, before
compiling a sales record. The Third Offset wants to adopt unicorns from outside the regular process
of defense acquisition. Unfortunately, the defense establishment has nothing in the organization to
find unicorns before America’s agile competitors, such as nonstate actors.
32      Taylor, Politics of Innovation; William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and
the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States
and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Michael E. Porter,
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990).
33      CSIS, webcast; Brian Fung, “The Huge Issue That’s Keeping Silicon Valley and the Pentagon
Apart,” Washington Post, June 10, 2016; and Tucker, “Pentagon Dawdles.”
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Governments without deep pockets who wish to emulate US
productivity in the private sector have tackled communication gaps
between novel suppliers and fluid demand with custom networks. In
the case of Mexico’s federal system, for example, an alphabet soup of
centralized government-sponsored organizations cooperates with local
governments, linking small suppliers to large foreign and domestic
corporations, universities, and investors in a loosely coordinated effort
to cultivate Mexican expansion into the innovative aerospace sector.34
The most salient success story in Josh Lerner’s Boulevard of Broken
Dreams comes from Israel, which following the US-led digital revolution
in consumer electronics and military affairs, transformed its economy
and its defense industry into an accomplished small-cap exporter of
high-tech goods and services. Lerner attributed Israel’s startling success
to government sponsored networks knitting civilian and military sectors
together, translating demand signals from the grassroots, and buffering
Israeli ministries from direct investments.35
In the much larger United States, could the Pentagon scale
Israeli-style networks between government agencies and venture
capitalists, investors and entrepreneurs, as well as emergent suppliers
and customers in the armed services? The story of defense- and privatesector synergy while building the internet indicates it should be possible.36
According to Linda Weiss in America Inc.?, the US military was present
at the creation to provide demand and initial funding for specialized
computer networks. At a later stage, smaller companies, who closely
resemble agile suppliers sought in today’s Third Offset, saw applications
for the novel defense infrastructure. These companies led second-stage
innovation, investing for commercial sales, and creating off-the-shelf
applications, which during the Second Offset, “spun back around” to
an innovative military for purchase and adaptation.
Universities, as part of the Vannevar Bush legacy after World War
II, funded applied research during the Cold War in part through federal
defense contracts.37 By the 1980s, many of the same tier I research
institutions in higher education were also taking up the slack in basic
research occasioned by sharp reductions in private sector support. At
the birth of the internet, then, university activities attracted the interest
of both defense offices and industry clusters for development, testing,
and technology acquisition. Academic research groups built working
relationships on both sides of the military-civilian divide, forming the
substrate through which the technology “spin-around” proceeded.
Simply replicating such change, however, will not reduce the
obstacles bedeviling the Third Offset. Spin-around may have functioned
well in the case of the internet during the Second Offset, and there is
reason to believe that spin-around in such areas as robotics, artificial
34      Mónica Casalet, “Meeting Growth Challenges of Mexico Aerospace: The Querétero
Cluster,” Space & Defense 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 39–53. For more on the role of social networks in
science and technology innovation, see Taylor, “How Nations Succeed—Networks, Clusters, and
Standards,” chap. 6 in Politics of Innovation.
35      Lerner, Boulevard of Broken Dreams, 155–57.
36      Spin-around and the development of the Internet are recounted in Linda Weiss, America
Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
37      Jonathan Cole, The Great American University: Its Rise to Preeminence; Its Indispensable National Role;
Why It Must Be Protected (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).
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intelligence, and neuro warfare could eventually enhance America’s
position. Unfortunately, Secretary Carter’s vision made clear that
macrolevel innovation over generations will not suffice for equipping US
servicemen and servicewomen at the fraying edges of the American-led
liberal order.38
Though it may be crucial over the long haul, spin-around does not
happen quickly enough to address fluid challenges under globalization:
adversaries demonstrate a knack for quickly devising asymmetric
responses to conventional US task forces, blunting their effectiveness
without provoking the United States into full mobilization. If Third
Offset technology is to keep pace, Pentagon reformers will have to find a
way to accelerate spin-on, the current process by which the armed services
obtain relevant innovation from small to midsize firms in the private
sector and deliver it to forces in the field.
A new system—what Acquisition Undersecretary Kendall called
a new architecture—for discovering and extracting ideas circulating
in the venture capital world will have to fill the gap between military
operators’ specialized needs and equally complex consumers’ demands.
To succeed at rapidly delivering private sector innovation, which today
includes global innovation, Third Offset architecture requires a unique
cadre, a human link, still missing from the organization Secretary Carter
prepared for the transition to a new administration.
National commitment to a Third Offset fueled by the private
sector creates an unprecedented call for a type of acquisition officer
at lower levels of the hierarchy, the intrepid riverboat captain. This
metaphor is apt in the sense that nineteenth-century pilots understood
themselves to be part of a larger profession: they acquired expertise
in principles of navigation and system management; they recognized
themselves as part of a corporate body infused with a certain esprit; and
they accepted a burden of social responsibility.39 Without their quasi
profession delivering staples and occasional luxuries along the young
country’s riverine circulatory system, disparate regions of the sprawling
democracy would not have flourished as one nation.
In Samuel Huntington’s treatise on the soldier and the state,
professionalism was handmaiden to autonomy for the officer corps,
allowing consummate professionals to apply their skill on behalf of
civilian authorities who inevitably viewed the world from a contrasting
perspective. Indeed, certain independence of action was crucial to the
effectiveness of river pilots in serving the successful political economy
of patrons living not on the highway but at both ends of their journey.
River pilots were the human link communicating supply with demand,
the medium of exchange that permitted mutually beneficial trade across
disparate cultures.
Unlike Huntington’s archetype, though, the best riverboat captains,
as much as scientific managers, were also craftsmen.40 Huntington
shied away from this metaphor. After all, craftsmen were inscrutable,
their successes unaccountable. The source of their genius could not be
38     Gideon Rose, “Out of Order? What’s Inside,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (January/February 2017).
39      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
40      Huntington, Soldier and the State, 28.
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intellectualized or codified in any text. No formal school could hone
their talent. Most important, the fruits of their labor could not be
harvested efficiently under imposition of far-reaching agencies from a
highly-organized state. Bureaucracies enabled professionals but trapped,
and eventually suffocated, artisans.
Even so, without an administrative bureaucracy to enforce
standard procedure on the river, the boat captain substituted flexible,
customizable guidance of professionalism, and where this could not
apply, he indulged freewheeling characteristics of the craftsman. The
river offers a rich metaphor for policy in the era of the Third Offset
as a symbol for freedom, adventure, and enterprise. The byways of
contemporary innovation hide obstacles to the uninitiated, but the flow
of ideas nevertheless binds great cities of contrasting cultures. Intrepid
pilots who know the river travel between civilizations. Cultural barriers
to communication that regularly stymie professionals or virtuosos in
other walks of life become permeable before the unique skill set and life
experiences of riverboat captains.
A similar communication among cultures and economies is
critical to success of the Pentagon’s Third Offset, which is reliant upon
continuous delivery of relevant, private-sector innovation the armed
services can adopt. A fatal flaw in the last administration’s defense
policy, which undercut acquisition reforms on a scale unseen since the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, is the missing cadre. The Third Offset is, tragically, a technology
supply policy through terra incognita for the Pentagon. As of this
writing, none of several organizations within the executive branch or
mandated by Congress to supplement defense acquisitions can play the
crucial mediating role in rapidly delivering science and technology from
the private sector to the services’ entrepôts in such a manner that the
innovations can be manufactured for battlefield advantage.
Individuals and specialized organizations within the Department
of Defense have been chartered to explore, mine, and bring home novel
solutions wherever they may find them. The undersecretary of defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics taps semi-independent, direct
reporting agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency and the Rapid Innovation Fund (that cooperates with small
business innovators). Below the undersecretary, an assistant secretary of
defense for Research and Engineering controls a phalanx of offices for
attracting, finding, and testing promising projects. When the identified
technology has the potential to reduce risk or to save defense dollars on
a high priority mission, the assistant secretary may form bureaucratic
alliances with the rest of AT&L. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
for example, focuses on matters related to weapons of mass destruction,
and belongs to a neighboring assistant secretary within AT&L. In fact,
with a research and development budget of $25 billion, research and
engineering under AT&L wields sufficient convening power to forge
cooperation across the Department of Defense, federal departments such
as Homeland Security, and at least in principle, research departments in
private industry.41
41      See also Alan Shaffer, “Communities of Interest: Collaborating on Technology Challenges,”
Defense AT&L 44, no. 2 (March–April 2015): 32–37.
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The trouble with all these organizational fixes is, despite the flow
of ideas, the topmost level of Pentagon bureaucracy tightly steers the
rudder. The results of such programs consistently align with Secretary
Carter’s essay on “Running the Pentagon Right.” If the secretary of
defense wants something for troops in the field, organizational reform
at the tactical level provides remarkable facility for reaching down and
across agencies to find the right prototype technology. As long as the
solution is already knocking around the acquisition system—similarly to
the MRAP at a nondescript, small-scale contractor—senior leaders can
pull hard, through (or around) regular development and testing phases,
to make an express delivery. These emergency overrides, though, despite
the commanding, virtuoso performance from top civilians, cannot
anoint a technical solution conceived outside the beltway family; the
prototypes far upriver remain out of sight, and out of reach, no matter
how sophisticated or lavish the offices in Washington.
The missing element of the Third Offset strategy is a midlevel
cadre that can navigate the currents and lock through the dams that
exist between innovative science and technology, sprouting in garages,
makeshift offices, and university campuses far from the nation’s capital,
and the military acquisition system. Unfortunately, bureaucratic slack that
would grant autonomy for such middle managers can barely be located
in the current budget environment. When dollars are tight and stakes
are high, senior decision makers instinctively grasp for greater control.
Centralizing authority and consolidating lines of communication create
narrow channels for the sake of efficiency.42 In the case of the Third
Offset, this natural inclination to institutionalize the revolution, or
manufacture a constant state of exception, is misguided: while top-down
virtuosity reliably rallies bureaucracy around the leader’s priorities, it
simultaneously stifles creativity and improvisation among midlevel
agents who must respond and conform to the leader’s call.43 The
Pentagon’s highly structured efforts at community-building maintain
accountability at the price of groupthink, establish the lockage priority,
and ultimately limit the flow of private-sector innovations that are vital
to success of the Third Offset.
When thick institutions must accommodate multiple cultures and
process a steady influx of novel information from divergent professions,
the most productive principal to agent relations often balance competing
considerations.44 The military agents of science and technology, our
riverboat captains, work best if they enjoy unusually high autonomy.
Freed from a suffocating web of monitoring and punishment—classic
instruments of fine control from a distant principal—the pilots venture
into the hinterland. They navigate time and space to acquire the language
of local innovators so that the Third Offset finally has a way to translate
42      Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25–30.
43      Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon Budget Maintains Support for Tech Innovation,” Defense News,
May 25, 2017; Freedberg and Clark, “DIUx”; Aaron Mehta, “DIUx Offers $36 Million in FY16
Contracts,” Defense News, October 14, 2016; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “DIUX Lite: Carter
Announces New Innovation Unit in Austin,” Breaking Defense, September 14, 2016.
44       Huntington, Soldier and the State; Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and Damon Coletta, “PrincipalAgent Theory in Complex Operations,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 306–21,
doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.778016.
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its unique, mostly classified demand signal into a problem definition that
is intelligible and actionable for private-sector business models.
Riverboat captains, even if captains by courtesy, are simultaneously
recognized in the admirals’ navy. When they return to home port
with exotic cargo—innovative designs that could disrupt routines in
Washington—they easily move through the Pentagon and relate to the
services’ highest ranks. Due to the captains’ high professionalism in the
Huntingtonian sense—mission critical expertise, widely recognized esprit
de corps, and deep-seated commitment to social responsibility—four-star
combatant commanders and civilian mandarins at the Pentagon may
welcome their reports without dreading their own bureaucratic future,
for there is little threat that the crew of a Third Offset venture would
stage a mutiny.45
Balanced principal-agent relations, recommended persuasively
by Huntington for military advice to civilian government during the
height of Cold War tensions, could now be replicated within the defense
bureaucracy to address a contemporary crisis in the Pentagon’s Third
Offset strategy.46 Conceding customary leverage—access, monitoring,
rewards, and punishments—to grant autonomy at lower ranks does
leave defense policy at the principal’s level open to being led by the
nose. For a similar reason, Huntington dedicated tracts of his great
work to redefining military professionalism for American statecraft, so
experts, such as those discovering and delivering commercial science
and technology, could ply their trade without substituting personal
preferences for democratically sanctioned authority.
Much authority now rests with civilian and military admirals
in charge of the leviathan that is the defense acquisition process.
They run the Pentagon right for many years and ascend the ranks by
administrating a tight ship. They hold their directorates accountable,
embracing their crew tightly and submitting them to the discipline of
regular order. When they do, though, they crowd out any possibility
for Huntington’s brilliant insight into these situations. As a result, the
cadre is almost entirely beached, caught in unending command churn
of furnishing capabilities, requirements, and resources. In the dominant
ethos of defense acquisition, mere captains do not judge risk; they avoid
it. Highly constrained agents of today’s Third Offset weed first-time
innovators out of technology development contracts. Our captains dare
not venture. They never invite start-up entrepreneurs on commercially
competitive terms, in the very language that nurtures much of twentyfirst century innovation, nor do they provide navigational guidance to
ferry revolutionary commerce from the hinterland of small and mediumsized enterprises to the mooring ring of Pentagon acquisition.47
45      Kaplan, Insurgents.
46      Huntington, Soldier and the State.
47      DIUx and the Pentagon responded to the shortfall by recruiting reservists as new riverboat
captains. It remains to be seen whether short-term, temporary duty is sufficient to bridge the culture
gap between the military services and tech start-ups producing innovation relevant to the Third
Offset. The reservists, to reach outside customary bureaucracy, may need assistance from active duty
science and technology cadres or directorates combining requisite autonomy and access to commands
that influence regular order in defense acquisition. Compare reporting by Mehta, “DIUx Offers $36
Million”; Scott Maucione, “DIUx Still Chugging Along in the Trump Administration,” Federal News
Radio, April 20, 2017; Freedberg, “DIUx Lite”; and Aaron Mehta, “DIUx Expects to Transition
Programs in Next Two Months,” Defense News, April 25, 2017.
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The range of challenges facing American servicemembers
continues to expand, becoming more complex as acquisition budgets
flatline. Running the Pentagon to make the latest offset right will
require judicious, rather than directed, relations with trusted agents of
those anxious chiefs in Washington. Many intrepid riverboat captains,
endowed with hard-won skills and freedom to navigate frontiers where
modern innovation thrives, are needed.
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